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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SUSPENSION oF STATE INSOLVENCY LAWS By OPERATION OF TEM
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT. The Supreme Court of Washington in
the recent decision of Armour & Co. v. Becker et al.,' has again
raised a question mooted since 1819, as to the effect of the existence
of a Federal Bankruptcy Act on the operation of a State Insolvency
Law. Under present conditions, the problem of the availability of
liquidating devices becomes peculiarly important, and warrants an
analysis of the existing law on the subject. In the instant case,
the plaintiff sought to recover the sum of $293.14 for goods and
merchandise delivered to defendant, who was running a meat mar-
ket and purchased goods until December 18, 1929, when he became
insolvent. Defendant then made an assignment for the benefit
of his creditors to one Beeson, which assignment was made, under
stipulated facts, strictly in accord with the insolvency statute of
Washington.2 Plaintiff received a check as his pro rata share under
this assignment, but did not negotiate it, and then brought this
action for the original sum due, against both the defendant market
owner and his guarantor, on the ground that the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act s had rendered the assignment void or voidable, and
that any creditor not having received payment in full would be
entitled to ignore the assignment and proceed to collect his claim
against the debtor and guarantor. The Supreme Court in affirm-
ing a judgment for the plaintiff, relied on the two cases of Ianterna-
2 67 Wash. Dec. 179, 9 Pac. (2d) 63 (1932) Since this note went to press
the Washington Supreme Court has followed the holding of the Instant case
!n Taccema Grocery Company v. Doersch, 68 Wash. Dec. 516 (1932).
2 Rem. Comp. Stat. 1086 et seq., Pierce's Code, 2854 et seq.
2 USCA. Title 1L
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ttonal Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,4 and Re Tarnowskt.' The Washington
court said.
"It was there distinctly held [in the PNnkus case] that
the passage of the Bankruptcy Act superseded the state
law, at least in so far as it relates to the distribution of
property and discharges to be given."
At the outset, it must be noted that the question dealt with here
is concerned only with state insolvency acts, and not with common
law assignments for the benefit of creditors. It seems there is a
direct conflict as to what constitutes an insolvency law. Some
courts held that it must contain a provision for the discharge of a
debtor.6 Others, however, state that such a provision is not neces-
sarv, but that provisions similar to those contained in the bank-
ruptcy act will be sufficient to make the law an insolvency code.
"The elements of an insolvency law are insolvency, sur-
render of property, its administration by a receiver or
trustee, distribution of the assets among the creditorsand
a provision for priorities or other matters not permissible
in the absence of such statute. A provision for the dis-
charge of the debtor from the unpaid balance of his debts
is not essential to make it an insolvency law."1
7
Probably all courts would agree that if a provision for discharge
of the debtor is present in the act, it is an insolvency statute.8
It is possible in reviewing the cases covering the principal ques-
tion involved, to divide the jurisdictions into three main classes.
The first class holds that during the existence of a national bank-
ruptcy law, all proceedings under a state insolvency law are null
and void for all purposes. The reasons for this doctrine are suc-
cinctly stated in International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,, where it is
said
"The power of Congress to establish uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States
is unrestricted and paramount The purpose to exclude
'278 U. S. 261, 73 L. ed. 318, 49 S. Ct. Rep. 108 (1928). For comments
on this case see 27 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 29 Col. J. Rev. 519.
6191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926).
In Re McElwatn, 296 Fed. 112 (1924) where it Is said: " but we
think that the gist of a bankrupt act is first to make a statutory dis-
tribution of the assets of an Insolvent to all his creditors, and, secondly,
to grant a statutory discharge." Pelton v. Sheridai, 74 Ore. 176, 144 Pac.
410 (1914) Greene v. Rice, 32 Idaho 504, 186 Pac. 249 (1919).
1Re Weedman Stave Co., 199 Fed. 948 (1912). Re Hall Co., 121 Fed. 992
(1903) Re Salmon, 143 Fed. 395 (1906) Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co.,
113 Fed. 992, 51 C. C. A. 1, 8 A. B. R. 29, certiorari denied 186 U. S. 484, 46
L. ed. 1261, 22 S. Ct. Rep. 943 (1902) Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110,
56 N. E. 363, 75 A. S. R. 147 (1900).
Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 27 L. ed. 760, 2 S. Ct. Rep. 765 (1882)
Ste lzwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 S. Ct. Rep. 215 (1918)
and see note in 49 A. L. R. 69L
' See note (4), supra.
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state action for the discharge of insolvent debtors may be
manifested without specific declaration to that end, that
which is clearly implied is of equal force as that which is
expressed The general rule is that an intention wholly
to exclude state action will not be implied unless, when
fairly interpreted, an Act of Congress is plainly in conflict
with state regulation of the same subject In respect of
bankruptcies the intention of Congress is plain. The
national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily ex-
cludes state regulation. It is apparent, without compar-
ison in detail of the provis~ons of the Bankruptcy Act with
those of the Arkansas statute, that intolerable inconsisten--
cies and confusion would result if that insolvency law be
given effect while the National Act is in force." 10
The attitude above stated probably represents a numerical minor-
ity of the cases, but as will be seen later, seems to be the modern
trend of authority
The second view taken by some jurisdictions is that the Bank-
ruptcy Act only suspends the action of the state insolvency laws,
when the bankruptcy act is invoked, that is, when a petition m
bankruptcy is filed within four months of an assignment under an
insolvency act.1" This doctrine, while in the minority, had much
more support in earlier cases than at present. While it is said
that until bankruptcy proceedings are actually instituted, no attack
can be made against proceedings under state insolvency laws -on
the theory that the bankruptcy act is paramount, which would
appear to be a refutation of the first view, it is clear that such
an adjudication avoids, rather than decides, the principal -ques-
tion.12 Under the bankruptcy act itself" any general assignment
"0 See also, Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 51 N. E. 529
(1898) Thorn hill v. Bank of La., Fed Cas. No. 13,992, app. dismissed,
Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 65, ZO L. ed. 60 (1870) Littlefield V. Gay,
96 Me. 422, 52 Atl. 925 (1902) Martin, v. Berry, 37 Cal. 208 (1869) Cor.
v. O'Hara, 6 Phila. 402, 3 Pitts, R. 70 (1867) Ketcham, -v. MeNamara, 72
Conn. 209, 46 AtI. 146, 50 L. R. A. 641 (1900) International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkis, supra, note (4) Johnson v. Chapman Milling Cjo., - Tex. Civ. App.
- 37 S. W (2d) 776 (1931). For a commendation of this view see article
by Samuel Williston in 22 Harv. L. Rev. 547.
The impression given by most of the cases listed In note 7 Is that those
courts if squarely presented with this view would follow it, and decide
that insolvency laws are totally suspended by the mere passage of the
Bankruptcy Act.
"Boese v. King, supra, note 8; Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., supra,
note 7 Boston Mercantile Co. v. Ould-Carter Co., 123 Ga. 458, 51 S. E. 466
(1905) Jqnsen-King-Byrd C'o. v. Williams, 35 Wash. 161, 76 Pac. 934
(1906) Patty-Joiner & Eubanks Co. v. Cummins, 93 Texas 598, 57 S. W
566 (1900) Shaw v. Standard Piano Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 350, 100 Atl. 167
(1917) Driver v. Garey, 143 Ark. 112, 220 S. W 667 (1920). Cf. Re Stand-
ard Ftller's Earth Co., 186 Fed. 578 (1911) In Re Bankshares Corpn. of
U. S., 50 Fed. (2d) 94, - C. C. A. - (1931) In Walker v. Emerwh, 300
Pa. 9, 149 Atl. 881 (1930), the case may be distinguished on the ground
that the state insolvency act was little more than a common law assign-
ment recording act; they state the rule, however.
"See Roberts Cotton Oil Co. v. F E. Morse Co., 97 Ark. 513, 135 S. W.
334 (1911).
"Sec. 3(a) (5) USCA, Tit. 11, see. 21(a) 4.
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for the benefit of creditors is an act of bankruptcy, and thus such
decisions do no more than follow the bankruptcy act, rather than
attempt to resolve the conflict between the two laws. Furthermore,
this same section applies as well to common-law assignments as to
assignments under an insolvency act, and since common-law assign-
ments are generally held valid despite the bankruptcy act on the
theory of contract rights and jus disponendi of the debtor 4 any
distinction which should be made between the two is lost.
The third, and probably the majority opinion, is that the in-
solvency law of the state is suspended only in so far as it conflicts
with the Bankruptcy Act. This attitude is certainly consistent
with the normal interpretation of the conflict between any state
and federal act, and raises a number of interesting and difficult
questions. This conclusion was first reached in the leading case
of Sturges v. Crowrnnshield,1' in which Chief Justice Marshall held
that the mere fact that the Constitution"8 gave Congress the power
to promulgate a uniform system of bankruptcy did not prevent
the states from passing insolvency laws, which would take effect
in the absence of such an uniform system, and that only when the
exercise of this power conflicted with the insolvency laws were the
latter suspended. Naturally, such a decision opens a great field
for judicial interpretation, but the ruling was affirmed in Ogden
v. Saunders" and Stellwagen v. Clum'8 where the court said.
"Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the
bankruptcy acts of Congress may recognize the laws of
the State in certain particulars, although such recognition
may lead to different results in different states Such
recognition in the application of state laws does not affect
the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, although in
these particulars the operation of the act is not alike m all
features. "19
Under the Bankruptcy Statute itself,20 there are three different
situations which arise, calling for the resolution of conflicts. In
the case of municipal, insurance, railroad, banking corporations,
or building and loan associations, neither voluntary or involuntary
1 Boese v. King, supra, note 8; Pogue v. Rowe, 236 I1. 157, 86 N. E. 207
(1908) Thompson v. Shaw, 104 Me. 85, 71 Ati. 370 (1908) Armour Pack-
sng Co. v. Brown, 76 Minn. 465, 79 N. NV. 522 (1899) Patty-Joiner d
Eubank Co. v. Cummins, supra, note 11, In re Sievers, 91 Fed. 366 (1899)
Bell v. Blessing, 225 Fed 750, - C. C. A. - (1915) Mayer v. Heilman, 91
U. S. 496, 23 L. ed. 377 (1876) Downer v. Porter 116 Ky. 422, 76 S. W
S. W 135 (1903) Binder v. McDonald, 106 Wis. 332, 82 N. W 156 (1900)
McAvoy v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906) Cadwallader v. Shaw,
127 Me. 172, 142 At. 580 (1928).
1" 4 Wheat. 122 (1819).
"Article I, section 8.
2" 12 Wheat. 213 (1827).
' See note 8, supra.
See also, Hazelwood v. Olinger Bldg. Dept. Stores, Inc., et al., - Wis.
- 236 N. W 591 (1931) Re Tarnowskt, supra note 5, Rayborn v. Reid,
139 S. C. 529, 138 S. E. 294 (1927).
' As amended Feb. 11, 1932 (Public-No. 27-72d Congress]: "See. 4.
who May Become Bankrupts.- (a) Any person, except a municipal, rail-
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bankruptcy is allowed. This immediately raises the question as
to the policy of Congresz in making such a provision. Was it to
deprive these entities of the benefits of any form of insolvency
proceeding, or was it merely considered -that state proceedings
would be more beneficial in such cases? It is possible for the
courts to take two views, either that by the mere fact that the
bankruptcy act mentions these persons, they are covered by the
bankruptcy act, and thus any provision in the insolvency act as to
them is suspended, or that since the benefits of the act are not
extended to them, they may come under provision of the insolvency
acts. In the particular case presented no decisions are found bear-
ing out the first possibility, except, of eourse, those that support the
rule that all proceedings under insolvency statutes are null and
void. But the attitude under the second theory is well expressed
in the ease of U S. vs. People's Trust Co. et al. :21
"While it is commonly said that the Bankruptcy Law of
1898 supersedes the Insolvency Act, this is true only so far
as the two acts conflict. Banking corporations are ex-
pressly excepted from the operation of the federal act.
Therefore the 'complete system of insolvency law' under
which the affairs of a state bank may be liquidated remains
m full force."
Another problem arises in the cases of wage-earners, or persons
engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, who are
allowed to become voluntary bankrupts, but not involuntary bank-
rupts. Again the same principles are involved. The recent case
of Adrin State Bank of Adrian v. Klinkhammer22 says.
"We are convinced that, while the National Bankruptcy
Act is in force, Chapter 90 of the General Statutes of 1913
is m abeyance and inoperative as to farmers, because it
attempts to act within the field appropriated by Congress
under the National Bankruptcy Act. To hold otherwise
would result in endless confusion and would circumvent
the purposes of the act of Congress which evidently in-
tended to protect the farmer from involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings. If we were to hold that Chapter 90 might be
invoked for the purpose of distribution for assets alone,
road, insurance, banking corporation, or a building and loan association,
shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a voluntary bankrupt.
"(b) Amy natural person, except a wage-earner, or a person engaged
chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any -unincorporated company,
and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, or a building and
loan assoczation, owing debts to the amount of $1,000 or over, may be
adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an impartial trial, and
shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this Act.
"The bankruptcy of a corporation or association shall not release its
officers, directors, or stockholders, as such, from any liability under the
laws of a State or Territory or of the United States."
Italics indicate the amendment made in 1932.
- N. H. - 155 Atl. 191 (1931).
182 Minn. 57, 233 N. W 588 (1930).
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and that only the provision for release of debtors is to be
inoperative during the time that the National Bankruptcy
Act is in effect, the Insolvency Act could be used for the
purpose of forcing farmers to take voluntary proceedings
under the National Bankruptcy Act, thus accomplishing
indirectly what Congress evidently did not intend to
permit. "
While on the other hand, a majority of other courts which have
passed on the question follow the reasoning as expressed in Old
Town Bank v. McCormick -.2
"He [defendant] says it is true that while class
[farmers] is not included in, and is expressly excepted
from, the voluntary feature of the system, yet ii is in-
cluded in the voluntary feature, and therefore it is within
the scope of the national system. We cannot approve of
this method of reasoning, not only because it would seem
to be a 'contradiction in terms to say that cases excepted
from the operation of the most important part of the act are
included in its scope,' but because it would seem to in-
volve the proposition that the federal power can render
inoperative the state insolvent laws applicable to involun-
tary insolvency, without establishing a genuine bankrupt
law to take the place of the state law. As we have already
seen, it has been held from an early day that it is only to
the extent that Congress has actually legislated upon the
subject that the statutes of the several states are suspended
by its legislation. How, then, can it be said that a failure
to legislate-in other words, an express exclusion-raises
a conflict ? it seems to us, that the position taken by the
defendant must necessarily lead to the conclusion that if
the Congress of the United States can, by including this
class in the voluntary part of the system, and excepting it
from the involuntary part, withdraw it from the operation
of our state insolvent law, it can do the same in regard to
any two or more classes (as, for instance, merchants,
traders, and corporations), and the result would be that,
in spite of the failure on the part of Congress to establish
a bankrupt law (that is, to actually exercise the power
conferred by the constitution to pass a genuine bankrupt
law) 26 state legislation would become inoperative, and
creditors would be deprived of a remedy to which
they are fairly entitled.
' 25
96 Md. 341, 53 AtI. 94 A. S. R. 577, 60 L. R. A. 577 (1903).
21 See Sturges v. Crowninshteld, supra note 15.
nAccord: Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 82 At!. 268, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 945
(1912) Rockville Nat. Bank v. Latham et al., 88 Conn. 70, 89 AtI. 1117
(1914) Pitcher v. Standish, 90 Conn. 601, 98 AtI. 93, L. R. A. 1917A, 105
(1916) In re McElwatn, supra note 6. Under the original act of 1898 (30 U.
S. Stat, at Large 544) which read before the amendment of 1910: "Sec. 4.
Who May Become Bankrupts.-(a) Any person who owes debts, except
a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a voluntary
bankrupt," raising the same problem as above, the following cases are in
accord: State National Bank of Denison v. Syndicate Cb. of Eureka
Springs ot al., 178 Fed. 359 (1910) Roberts Cotton Oil Go .v. F E. Morse d
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A similar situation is presented where the debts of the insolvent
are not sufficient to allow him to be put into involuntary bank-
ruptcy, and the question then arises, whether this situation being
covered by the bankruptcy act prevents the creditors from taking
advantage of a provision of the insolvency act, in order to wind up
the debtor's estate. The same typical conflict is found, some
courts holding that such a debtor may come under the provisions
of the insolvency act,26 others holding that the bankruptcy act has
covered the situation and supersedes all insolvency laws on the
same subject.27
Having the various rulings before one, it is apparent that the
cases holding under the third class that the Bankruptcy Act having
actually mentioned a certain class, has superseded the insolvency
laws as to them, may as easily be placed in the first category,
namely, among those courts which believe the Bankruptcy Act has
immediately suspended the working of all insolvency laws. In
result, at least, this is the case, although the language in most of
the cases will not support that premise.
What will be the result in Washington and in what class does the
principal case fall? A study of the cases on the principal ques-
tion reveals that a ma3ority of courts have always followed the
ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States almost implicitly
when treating this question. It is very possible, of course, that state
courts may interpret such decisions differently, but in the marn,
the results are about the same. From Sturges v. Crownwhseld2s
to International Shoe Co. v. Pinks 29 the court of the United States
has shown a complete change of reasoning. The latter case if given
an unstrained construction, both from the standpoint of result
reached and the argument used, would seem to support the view
that all insolvency laws are superseded, due to the need for uni-
formity throughout the United States. This construction is borne
out by the few state cases following it.'G However, the principal
case also cites with approval the Wisconsin case of Re Tarnowss%,3
which holds that though the discharge provision of the act is sus-
pended, the regulatory features are still in effect. There seems to
be a radical difference between the two cases. While it may be
justly argued, that from a practical standpoint, the result of the
Wisconsin case should be reached, it hardly seems probable that in
view of the United States case it will be reached, and at least, if
the Washington court holds that the regulatory features of our
act are still in effect, it may serve as a ground for appeal to the
Federal system. AnTHUR GRUNBAux.
Co., supra note 12; Keystone Driller Co. v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 138
Cal. 738, 72 Pac. 399 (1903) Dille v. People, 118 Ill. App. 426 (1905)
Rogers v. Boston Club et al., 205 Mass. 261, 91 N. E. 321, 28 L. R. A. (ns) 743
(1910) Landis Machine Co. v. Cooper 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 416 (1913) and
under former acts, Simpson v. City Saings Bank, 56 N. H. 466, 22 Am.
Rep. 491 (1876).
Shepardson's Appeal 36 Conn. 23 (1869).
"International Shoe Co. v. Pincus, supra note 4; Johnson v. Chapmas
Milling Co., supra note 10; and the principal case, supra note .
0 Supra, note 15.
22 Supra, note 4.
30 Supra, note 27, but see Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 75 L. ed. 1060,
51 S. Ct. Rep. 465 (1931).
21 Supra, note 5.
